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I. ABSTRACT
During the 1970s an extensive theoretical literature has developed
analyzing market determination of freely floating exchange rates. At the
same time, there has been extensive and continuous intervention in the
market by central banks. Exchange rates have not been floating freely;
they have been managed, or manipulated, by central banks. However, most
of the description of exchange rate policy, as actually practiced, has been
informal, or "literary," not integrated with the formal theoretical litera-
ture. Recent examples are the surveys in Branson (l98la) and Mussa (1981).
In this paper I integrate exchange—rate policy into a model of exchange—
rate behavior, and examine the monthly data from the l970s econometrically,
to infer hypotheses about policy behavior. I focus on four major curren-
cies, the U.S. dollar, the Deutschemark, Sterling, and the Japanese yen,
and analyze movements in their effective (weighted) exchange rates as
calculated by the IMF.
In section II a model of market determination of a floating exchange—rate
is laid out. It is a rational—expectations version of the model in Branson
(1977), and it draws on the model of Kouri (1978). It is the same as the
model in Branson (1983). The model shows how unanticipated movements in
money, the current account, and relative price levels will cause first
a jump in the exchange rate, and then a movement along a "saddle path" to
the new long run equilibrium. Here the role of "news" in moving the exchange
rate, as recently emphasized by Dornbusch (1980) and Frenkel (1981), is clear.
The model emphasizes imperfect substitutability between domestic and foreign
bonds, in order to prepare for the analysis of intervention policy in section III.
Exchange—rate policy is introduced in section III. We analyze the
options available to the central bank that wants to reduce the jump in the
exchangerate following a real or monetary disturbance——"news" about the
current account, relative prices, or money. This isthepolicy character-
ized as"leaning against the wind" in Branson (1976). The distinction is
made between monetary policy and sterilized intervention.
In section IV we turn to the monthly data. The quarterly data were
analyzed in Branson (1983). Systems of vector autoregressions (VARs) are
estimated for each of the countries, and the correlations among their resid-
uals are studied. These represent the "innovations," or "news" in the time
series. A clear pattern emerges in these correlations, in which policy in
the U.S. and Japan drives exchange rates, and policy in Germany and the
U.K. reacts by moving interest rates, and by sterilized intervention. This
is essentially the same result thatappearedon the quarterly data in
Branson (1983). Thus the analyses tend to reinforce each other; both data
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II. An Asset—Market Model with Rational Expectations
II.A. Introduction
The purpose of this section is to lay out a simple asset—market model
of exchange—rate determination within which, in the next section,monetary
policy reaction to movements in the exchange rate can be analyzed. The
literature of the l970s has identified three principal macroeconomic vari-
ables that influence movements in exchange rates. These are money supplies,
relative price levels, and current—account balances. Here I develop a re-
presentative model that explicitly includes all three elements. The model
is an extension of the asset—market model sketched in Branson (1975), and
developed in full in Branson (1977). It is a close relative of Kouri
(1982). In the early versions of this model the focus was on the roles of
relative prices and asset markets, and static expectations were assumed..
Here the model is extended to study the effects of underlying "real" dis-
turbances influencing the current account and to include explicitly policy
intervention in a rational expectations framework.
II.B. Asset—market specification.
To make the analysis manageable, let us consider one country in a
many—country world. We can aggregate the assets available in this country
into a domestic money stock M, which is a nonearning asset, holdings of
domestically—issued assets B, which are denominated in home currency, and
net holdings of foreign—issued assets F, which are denominated in foreign
exchange.—' B (for bonds) is government debt held by theprivate sector,
/Since the analysis here applies to any single country in the international
financial system, I use the terms 'home' and 'foreign' to denote the country
being discussed and the rest of the system, respectively. At the level of
generality of this discussion no damage would be done if the reader substi-
tuted "US for 'home country', 'dollar' for 'home currency' and 'Fed' for
'central bank'.4.
and BC is government debt held by the central bank. Total government debt
B =B+ B F (for foreign assets) is the net claims on foreigners held
by the domestic private sector and R is central bank foreign reserves.
Total national net claims on foreigners F =F+ R. The money stock N is
equal to R + BC, with a 100% reserve system. I assume the initial ex-
change rate is indexed to unity, and that the central bank does not permit
capital gains or losses in R to influence M. The current account in the
balance of payments gives the rate of accumulation of F over time. The
rate of accumulation of B is the government deficit. N is controlled by
central bank purchases (or sales) of B or F from (or to) the domestic
private sector.
The rate of return on F is given by ,fixedin the world capital
market, plus the expected rate of increase in the exchange rate, ê. The
rate of return on B is the domestic interest rate r, to be determined in
domestic financial markets. Total private—sector wealth, at any point in
time, is given by W =N+ B + eF, so here the exchange rate e, in home
currency per unit of foreign exchange (e.g. $0.50 per DM), translates the
foreign—exchange value of F into home currency.
The total supplies of B and F to the national economy are given at
each point in time. Each can be accumulated only over time through foreign
or domesticinvestment.'1 Given the existing stocks of B and F at any
2/Since F is home claims on foreigners less home liabilities to foreigners,
an asset swap which exchanges a claim and a liability with a foreign asset—
holder is a transaction within F, changing claims and liabilities by the
sameamount.This transaction would leave F and B unchanged. The reason
for using this particular aggregation will become clear when we study dy—
namic adjustment below. Basically, we want to define net foreign assets
consistently with the balance of payments and national income and product
accounts, which record the capital account balance as the change in U.S.
private holdings of net foreign assets. The assumptions outlined above
make M and B non—traded assets. This implies that the total stocks of N,
B, and F in domestic portfolios are given at any point in time.5.
point in time, the central bank can make discrete changes in M by swapping
either B or F with the domestic private sector; these are open—market op-
erations in government debt or foreign assets.
The demand for each asset by the private sector depends on wealth,
W =M+ B + eF, and both rates of return, r and + ê. As wealthrises,
demands for all three assets increase. The demands for B and F depend
positively on their own rates of return and negatively on those of the
other assets. The demand for money depends negatively on both r and
+ ê; as either rises, asset—holders attempt to shift from money into the
asset whose return has gone up.
These asset—market equilibrium conditions are summarized in equations
(1) —(6).
(1)M ER+ BC =m(r,+ ê)•W.





Equation (4) is the balance sheet constraint, which ensures that
m + b + f =1.The three demand functions give the desired distribution of
the domestic wealth portfolio W into the three assets. Specifying the as-
set demand functions as homogeneous in wealth eliminates the price level
from the asset—market equilibrium conditions. Given the balance sheet6.
constraint (4), and gross substitutability of the three assets, we have
the constraints on partial derivatives of the distribution functions:
mr + r =br
<0: m + b =f<0.
Here a subscript denotes a partial derivative. The three market equili-
brium conditions (l)—(3) contain two independent equations given the bal-
ance sheet constraint (4). In equation (5) the bar over B indicates that
the total supply of government debt is fixed.
II.C. Asset accumulation and the current account.
Equations (l)—(6) provide the specification of asset markets in the
model. The other main building block of the model is the current—account
equation. The balance—of—payments accounts provide the identity
+ x + (F + R)X + rF.
where X is net exports of goods and non—capital services in terms of for-
eign exchange. Net exports depend on the real exchange rate e/p, private
sector wealth W, (given by equatIon (4) above), and an exogenousshift
factor z which represents real events such as changes in tastes in tech-
nology, oil discoveries, etc., which increase net exportsfor given values
of e/p and W. Thus we can write
X=X(eIP,W, z); Xe >0X. <0;X >0.
The sign of Xe assumes the Marshall—Lerner condition holds; X reflects
wealtheffects on import demand.
Substitutionof the function for net exports into the balance—of—
payments identity gives us the equation for accumulationof national net7.
foreignassets:
(7) X(e/p, W, z)+p.
Itis important to note that open—market swaps between thecentral bank
andthedomestic private sector have no direct effect on W or F in (7).
And the effectof accumulation of national net foreign assets through a
current—account surplus ('> 0)on W and F is the sameregardlessof the
distributionofFbetween Fand R. Sincean increase in R, ceteris
paribus, increases the money stock, which is part of W, anyincreaseinF
will raiseW by dP independently of thesplitbetween F and R. Thus the
centralbank's intervention policy will have no effect on how a current—
account balance moves F and W in (7).
The effect of an increase in F onin (7) is unclear.
-
with <0and >0.Below we willconvenientlyassume that SF/F =0;
itwill quickly become apparent why this is convenient. InBranson (1981),
thecase where F/F <0is analyzed.
Equations (l)-(7) plus the assumption of rational expectations (or,
more precisely, perfect foresight in this non—stochastic model) give us a
complete dynamicmodelin F andê.Price dynamics are suppressed, but we
willdiscussbelow exogenous price movements as delayed response to mone-
tary shocks.
II.D. Solution of the model.
Solution of the model proceeds as follows. First, the rational expec-
tations assumptionisthatis the rate of change of e. Then twoequations8.
of (l)—(3), with wealth substituted from (4) can be used to solve for r and
ê as functions of M, W, Theê and F equations then are two dynamic
equations in e and F that can be solved for the movement in these two
variables.
Divide equations (1) and (3) by W and differentiate totally, holding
r constant:
(8) d() =mrdr+ m.dê
Pp d(—) =fdr + fdê W r e
These can be solved in matrix form as:
dF \
(9)(dr\ r _mi (d(-_—)\
dê) (mrfêfrm&) [r mrj
,)
Thesolution for dê is then
(10) d =mf...frmê[_fr(1+ mrd()]





This is the dynamic equation to be solved along with (7) for 'toobtain
equilibrium e and F'.
In the e, F space of Figure 1, the ê =0locus is a rectangular
hyperbola. This can be seen by observing that in 4,eand F'enter multiplica—














Figure 3: Equilibrium path
for e, F10.
hold the product eF constant will hold ê constant. Combinations of e and
F off the locus move e away from it, as the arrows show. For example,
since >0an increase in e or F from a point on the locus makes
ê >0.
An increase in M/W, holding eF/W constant, would shift the ê =0
locus in Figure 1 up. This would be the result of an expansionary open—
market operation in the government debt market with dBc =dM>0,and no
change in FC or F. An increase in eF/W, holding M/W constant, will
shift ê =0down; this could result from an open—market swap between F and
B. An expansionary open—market operation in the foreign asset market, with
the central bank exchanging M for F with the private sector, would shift
ê =0up both by increasing M/W and reducing eF/W. This will provide the
difference between intervention in the bond or foreign—asset markets in
the model.
For given values of z and p in theequation (7), the F0 locus in
e, F space is a horizontal line at the a value where X =rF.This is
shown in Figure 2. If e is above this value, the current—account is in
surplus and F >0.In section III we will introduce a "leaning against
the wind" exchange—rate policy in which the authorities attempt to reduce
the extent of jumps in the exchange rate, but not to reverse them. Thus
we rule out here the possibility that the monetary authority "over—
intervenes," and assume that the sign of is the same as the sign of ';
thisis the same as assuming <1FI.This essentially assumes that the
authorities permit the market to guide the system towards its long—run
equilibrium, but perhaps slow the movement. The assumption gives the ar-
rows showing movement in Figure 2; above F =0,F >0,below it is negative.11.
An increase in z in (7) will shift the F =0locus down.Giventhe
assumption that + r =0,the extent of the shift is simply given by the





If z rises, increasing X and giving a current account surplus, e must fall
(currency appreciate) enough to restore the original value of X. An in-
crease in P will shift '= 0up, with
de— —l dp0
Equilibrium of the system is shown in Figure 3. There is one saddle—
path into the equilibrium shown by the dashed line. For a given value of
F, it is assumed that following a disturbance, the market will pick the
value for e that puts the system on the saddlepath toward equilibrium.
The system would have quite different properties under a policy regime of
"over—intervention" that reversed the pattern of movement in the horizontal
direction.
II.E. Reaction to Exogenous Shocks.
II.E.l Monetary disturbance.
Consider an (unanticipated) expansionary open—market operation in
government debt. This initially leaves W and F unchanged. There are two
extreme assumptions on price adjustment to consider: no change in P, or
dP/P =dN/Mimmediately.
With no change in P as M increases, the=0locus in Figure 4 does














rate jumps (currency depreciates) from initial equilibrium E0 to E1 on
the new saddlepath. This establishes ê <0as needed for asset—holders
to hold the existing stock of F given the lower interest rate. The
rise in eIP generates a current—account surplus, and F rises with e f all—
ing toward E2. This is an extreme form of "overshooting."
Suppose the domestic price level immediately reacts by rising by the
same proportion as the money stock. Then F =0also shifts up by that
same proportion. The extent of the upward shift in & =0depends on ini-
tial portfolio distribution and the degree of substitutability among F,
M, and B. One borderline case would be M =eFand m =f.Itcan be r r
seen in the expression for dê in equation (lO) that in this case a propor-
tional increase in e will maintain ê =0.To the extent that M >eFor
If1 > Imi,the ê =0curve would shift up more than=0,requiring
"overshooting" and ê <0,*1' >0moving to equilibrium. The reverse ini-
tial conditions would yield "undershooting" with ê >0,F <0in the
movement to equilibrium.
II.E.2. Real disturbance.
The effect of an unanticipated fall in z (or an increase in P) is
shown in Figure 5. The decrease in competitiveness shifts F =0up from
its initial intersection with ê =0at E0. The exchange rate jumps
(currency depreciates) from E0 to E1, and then gradually rises to E2 as
F falls. The depreciation of the currency restores current—account bal—
ance (F =0).The model "undershoots" in response to real disturbances.14.
II.E.3. Sluggish price adjustment.
A limiting case of sluggish price adjustment could be modelled as a
combination of Figures 4 and 5. Expansionary monetary policy would begin
this process illustrated in Figure 4. The delayed price response would
then resemble Figure 5. To the extent that the price response is lagged
and unanticipated, the e, F point would follow a path illustrated in
Figure 6. Quicker price response or anticipation would straighten the
path to E2, which maybeto the right or left ofE dependingon initial
portfolio distribution and substitutability.
II.F. Conclusions and empirical implications.
It is convenient to s1-rize here the basic conclusions from the
analysis so far.
1.Unanticipatedchanges inmoney,the price level, or under-
lyingreal conditions should cause a jtp in the exchange
rate toward the new rational—expectations saddle path.
2. Thusweshould expect to seecorrelationbetween unantici-
pated movementsin e and M, X, and P in the data.
Evidence on quarterly data was presented in Branson (1983);
monthly data are presented below.
3..Mov.iiient of the exchange rate followinga rca].disturbance
is likely to be monotonic, whilemonetarydisturbances are
likely to produce tIo.qershooting.ti Lagged price adjustment
makes "multiple overshooting" possible. This can be seen
in a combinationofFigures 4 and 6.15.
III."LeaningAgainst the Wind" as Exchange Rate Policy
III.A. Introduction.
There is already ample evidence that monetary authorities havegen-
erally tried to slow the movement of exchange rates. This type of inter-
vention has long been characteristic of U.S. domestic monetary policy; in
Branson (1976) I labelled this "leaning against the wind" as exchange
rate policy. Artus (1976) and Branson, Haittunen and Masson (BI'f) (l977'
presented evidence that German monetary policy responded to movements
in the exchange rate in this fashion. B1 (1977) estimated a reaction
function of the form N cthe + ...,with <0for Germany. As the ex-
change rate rose (DM depreciated), the money supply was reduced (relative
to its trend). Amano (1979) describes Japanese monetary policy as attempt-
ing to stabilize the exchange rate similarly. U.K. exchange rate policy
was discussed briefly in OECD (1977), where a regression of the form
8e + ...,withrm the minimumlendingrate (R) and 8 >0is reported.
This suggests that when sterling depreciated (e rose), the R was
ed as a policy reaction. More recently, Mussa (1981) has presented a tho-
rough review of exchange—rate intervention which is consistent with a
"leaning—against—the—wind" model.
Thepurposeof this section of the paper is to characterize policy in-
tervention in terms of the model of section II, to prepare for interpre-
tation of the empirical results in section IV below. The objective is not
to evaluate policy; it is to describe it. The main difference from the
previous models is the description of intervention as instantaneous and
discrete changes in asset stocks via open—market operations to reduce the
size of discontinuous ji.ps in exchange rates. This type of polIcy be-
havior isdiscernabie nthe "innovac.on' corejationsin sectionIV below.16.
We will begin with the description of monetary policy reaction to
real disturbances via open—market operations in government debt or f or—
eign assets. Then we study sterilized intervention in the foreign asset
market.
111.3. Monetary policy.
Consider a real disturbance to the current account that shifts
0 up, (rise in a) to restore equilibrium. This is illustrated in
Figure 7, where in the absence of policy intervention, the exchange rate
would jump from the initial equilibrium E0 to and then depreciate fur-
ther to E2. If the central bank tightened money by selling bonds to the
public, holding P initially constant, the ê —0curve in Figure 7 would
shift down as shown by the dashed ê a o• Thiswould shift the saddle
path down to the path running to E2, and reduce the exchange—rate jump to
E1. Thus instantaneous intervention would reduce the initial jump in e.
This would be an unexpected change in M, since the originating shift in
z and X was unexpected. So this type of intervention could reduce the
variability of a over time.
If the open—market operation were done in the foreign asset market,
asmaller quantitative intervention wouldgive the same shift in 0
and inthe saddle path inFigure7,becauseeF/W inequation(8) would
rise. In addition, since P would rise, the initial jumpwouldbe to a
pointon thenewsaddlepath below E1. Thusintervention on theforeign—
asset marketwould,in a sense, be more efficient than open—market opera-
tions inthebond market. This is essentially the same result that is ob-
tainedbyBranson (1977) and Kenen (1982) under static expectations.40
018.
III.C. Sterilized Intervention.
There is by now ample evidence that central banks intervene in the
foreign exchange markets but attempt to prevent the intervention from
changing the path of N. The literature was cited in Whitman (1975); more
recent results are discussed in Obstfeld (1980) (1982). In terms of the
model of section III, this is an open—market exchange of foreign assets
for bonds by the central bank, with iB —eF initially. The result is
again a downward shift in=0,as in Figure 7, plus an outward shift in
F. Thus the jump in the exchange rate is to a point below E1, since
increases. This presents the possibility for intervention that does not
move the path of the money supply.
111.1).Empirical, implications.
The principal empirical implication of the present model of policy
intervention is that we should observe the intervention in the correlation
of unexpected movements or "innovations" in exchange rates with innova-
tions in money and/or reserves. Monetary intervention would give a nega-
tive correlation between exchange—rate and money innovations. Interven-
tion with interest—rate control would give a positive correlation between
exchange—rate and interest—rate innovations. If the monetary intervention
is done in the foreign—asset market, a positive correlation between
exchange—rate innovations and reserves would result. Sterilized interven-
tion would give the reserve—exchange rate correlation without a money—
exchange rate correlation. Thus we can study the correlation matrix of
innovations in section IV below to infer hypotheses about policy behavior.19.
IV. Empirical Results Using Vector Autoregression
IV.A. Introduction.
A useful technique for studying the relationships between the inno-
vations in money, the current account balance, relative price levels, interest
rates, reserves, industrial production, and the exchange rate is vector autore—
gression (VAR). Here each variable of a system is regressed against the lagged
values of all variables (including itself) in the system, to extract any
information existing in the movements of these variables. The residuals
from these "vector autoregressions" are the innovations ——theunantici—
•pated movements ——inthe variables. We can study the correlations of
the residuals to see if they are consistent with the hypotheses implied
by the theory of sections II and III. The vector autoregression techni-
que is introduced and justified by Sims (1980). A clear exposition is
presented in Sargent (1979). Interesting and instructive applications
are discussed in Taylor (1980), Ashenfelter and Card (1981), and Fischer
(1981)
Here I estimate systems of VARs on monthly data for each of the four
countries, the U.S., the U.K., Germany, and Japan. The data are described
in Table 1. Two systems were estimated for each country. Both include the
effective exchange rate e, the current account balance CAB, and the effec-
tive relative price PIP, the interest rate IS, industrial production Y,
reserves R; the difference between the two is that one includes Ml and the
other M3. Industrial production is added to control for business—cycle ef-
fects on the demand for money.20.
Table 1: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND DATA
I. Variable Name
e effective nominal exchange rate, in units of domestic
currency per unit of foreign currency as computed by
the IMP.
relative wholesale prices (ratio of home to competitors
indices).
Ml narrow money, as defined by the IMP in the International
Financial Statistics (IFS),
M3 broad money, as defined by the IMP (Ml plus quasi—money)
in the IFS
CAB current account balance.






Federal Republic of Germany
Japan
III. Data
1. All data are monthly, and cover 1971:1 to 1980:12 unless
otherwise noted.
2. Exchange Rates: e is the log of the average effective ex—
change rate during month t. The units are domestic currency
per unit of foreign currency. The index is based on a geome-
trically weighted average of bilateral rates between the home
and 13 other industrial countries. The weights are the same
as those used to calculated P/P. Base: 1975 =100.Source:
IMF. Note that these are not the MERM rates published in IFS.
3. Relative Prices: The index is a log of the ratio of home to
foreign monthly wholesale price indices. P is a composite
and uses the same weights as e does (see above). Base =1975.
Source: IMP. This index is not the same as that published in
the IFS. Our data is based on indices in local (not a common)
currency. Series length: 1971:7 to 1980:12
4. Money Stocks: This is the log of the monthly money stock.
German and Japanese data are end of the period money stocks
from IFS, "money" for Ml and "money + quasi—money" for N3.
UK data are from OECD, MaIn EconomIc Indicators, varIous is-
sues. Series length: 1971:10—1980:12. U.S. data ar monthly
averages from Citibank Economic Data Base.
5. Current Account: This is the dollar value of the flow during
the month (not measured in logs). German data are from Deutsche
Bundesbank, Monthly Report, various issues converted to U.S.
dollars using line rf of IFS. Japanese data are from Bank of
Japan, Economic Statistics Monthly, various issues. U.S. and
U.K. monthly data are quarterly data from IFS (described in
Branson (1983)), interpolated following the monthly trade bal—
ance from IFS converted to dollars using line rf in the case
of the U.K. The interpolation was performed using the procedure
of Chow and Lin (1971).6. Short—term interest rate: Data are taken from IFS as
indicated in the Table on "Money Market and Euro Dollar
Rates." Source: IFS country pages
7. Reserves: These are the dollar value of reserves mea-
sured at end of period. Source: IFS. These series
did not vary significantly from the series adjusted for
valuation changes provided by the IMP.
8. Industrial Production: This is the log of the monthly
index of industrial production. Source: IFS.
22.23.
The lengths of the lags in the VARs were chosen by a series of pre—
liminary univariate autogressions for each variable. The lag length in
the VAR for each variable was set at the maximum number of significant
lags in the univariate autoregression for that variable. The procedure
is described in some detail in Branson (1983). The one exception is
Japan, where the current—account balance has significant lags at one
month and five months. Separate VAR systems were estimated for Japan
using one and five lags on CAB. The results were essentially the same,
so only the one—lag system is reported here. The lag lengths and details
of specification are summarized in Table 2.
The VARs, then, are a system of regressions of the current value of
each of the variables listed in Table 2 on the indicated lags on all the
variables, with the same set of regressors for each equation. A separate
system is estimated for each country. The residuals from the VARs are
denoted by a 'overthe dependent variable.
After the VAR systems are estimated, we correlate their residuals to
study the relationship among innovations. The correlations are given for
the systems with Ml for the U.S., Germany, and Japan, and both Ml and M3
for the U.K. in Tables 3—7 below. The two sets of correlations are suf-
ficiently similar in the cases of the U.S., Germany; and Japan, that sep-
arate discussions of them are unnecessary. Each table includes the corre-
lation coefficients among the VAR "innovations" and in parentheses the
probability of that correlation occurring under the null hypothesis that
the true correlation is zero. In discussing the correlations, we will fo-





ine 2 2 2 2
inP/P 2 2 2 2
inM 2 3 1 2
R 2 1 2 2
IS 3 2 2 2
CAB 3 2 2 1
inY 2 1 1 1
1. All VARs included ii monthly dummies and an intercept.
2. Regressions estimated in monthly data 1973:7 to 1980:12.
3. Two VAR systems were estimated for each country, one
with Ml, the other with M3.
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determination and policy. Detailed discussion of all the results would be
far too tedious.
IV.B. United States
The correlations of VAR innovations for the U.S. Ml system are shown
in Table 3. Remember that the effective nominal exchange rate is defined
in units of home currency per unit of foreign exchange. So an increase in
e is a depreciation.
The first row of Table 3 gives the correlations of exchange—rate
innovations with those in the other variables. The positive sign for Ml
and the negative sign for the short—term interest rate IS are consistent
with monetary policy driving the exchange rate. The negative correlation
of e and R, and the positive correlation of CAB and R are both consistent
with "leaning against the wind" intervention in the exchange markets. An
unanticipated increase in the current account surplus or appreciation of
the dollar (a negative )issignificantly associated with an increase
in U.S. reserves. The reserve and Ml innovations have an insignificant
negative correlation, indicating that exchange—market intervention is
sterilized. The M3 VAR innovations for the U.S. have the same pattern.
The hypotheses that I would infer from the U.S. data are as follows.
On a monthly time scale money and interest rates move the exchange rate,
with little role for relative prices. Monetary policy is essentially
oriented toward domestic targets; movement in the exchange rate is a side
effect. The U.S. monetary authorities intervene and sterilize, but do not
follow a tight rule. This shows up in the strong correlation between R
and CAB, and in the correlation between R and e.Table 3 : Correlations of Innovations from U.S. Monthly
Vector Autoregression System with Ml
e P/P Ml R IS CAB Y
1.00 —.00 .18 —.24 —.48—.0 .11
(.99) (.10) (.02) (.00) (.43) (.29)
P/P 1.00 —.12 .01 .27 —.19 —.07
(.25) (.93) (.01) (.08) (.49)
"U
Ml 1.00 —.17 —.05 .06 —.02
(.11) (.67) (.57) (.85)
R 1.00 —.08 .21 .02
(.48) (.06) (.85)
"U






Note :CABisthe monthly interpolation of the quarterly
current account using the monthly trade data and
the Chow—Lin interpolation procedure.
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IV.C. Germany
The innovation correlations of the Ml system for Germany are shown
in Table 4. In the first row we see a very strong positive correlation
between exchange—rate and relative price innovations. This could come
from exchange rates causing prices or vice versa, but through innovations
andmarketexpectations rather than a tight PPP relationship. The corre-
lation of exchange—rate innovations with reserves must reflect leaning—
against—the—wind policy in terms of exchange—market intervention. The
lack of correlation between money and reserves or exchange rates indicates
that intervention is sterilized. The negative correlation between money
and industrial production could indicate that monetary policy attempts to
stabilize real output. The German M3 VAR correlations show essentially
the same pattern.
Thus the German data suggest fairly strongly a situation in which
(a) price and exchange—rate innovations go together, and (b) the authori-
ties react to exchange—rate movements through sterlized intervention. This
is consistent with the earlier results of BHN (1977) and of Herring—Marston
(1977) for the fixed—rate regime.
IV.D. United Kingdom
The U.K. correlations are shown in Tables 5 and 6 for the Ml and M3
systems, respectively. Comparison of the correlations between exchange—
rate and money innovations suggests that news about M3, but not Ml, moves
the exchange rate. The monthly correlation between innovations in rela-
tive prices and the exchange rate is virtually zero. In both tables we
see correlations between exchange—rate innovations and those in reserves28.
Table 4 Correlations of Innovations from German Monthly
Vector Autorgressjon System with Ml
e P/P Ml R IS CAB Y
e 1.00 .22 —.05 —.33 .14 .16 —.01
(.04)(.64)(.00)(.21)(.14)(.96)
P/P 1.00 —.00 .13 .07 .16 .03
(.97) (.23) (.52) (.15) (.78)
1.00 .03 —.17 .11 —.24
(.81) (.12) (.32) (.02)
1\
R 1.00 —.08 .02 .08
(.46) (.84) (.48)
f'J






Note : CAB are the monthly data from Monthly Report
of the Deutsche Bundesbank.29.
Table 5: Correlations of Innovations from U.K. Monthly
Vector Autoregression System with Ml.
1\J r\J rJ
e P/P Ml R IS CAB Y
1.00 —.02 —.08 —.36 .30 —.05 —.07
(.83) (.47) (.00) (.00) (.65) (.52)
l.%J
P/ 1.00 .03 .18 —.05 —.11 .09
(.80) (.10) (.63) (.31) (.41)
Mi 1.00 —.23 —.25 —.09 —.13
(.03) (.02) (.39) (.24)
R 1.00 —.09 —.27 .27
(.41) (.01) (.01)
r'J






Note CAB is interpolated quarterly data as in U.S. case.30.
Table 6 : Correlations of Innovations from U.K. Monthly
Vector Autoregressici System with M3.
P/P M3 R IS CAB Y
e 1.00 —.07 .25 —.42 .35 —.05 —.03
(.52) (.02) (.00) (.00) (.66) (.76)
P/P 1.00 —.19 .28 —.17 —.09 .02
(.08 (.01) (.12) (.42) (.83)
f'J
M3 1.00 —.36 .16 .25 —.17
(.Ô0) (.15) (.02) (.11)
R 1.00 —.25 —.17 .12
(.02) (.12) (.27)






and short—term interest rates that are a strong indication of leaning—
against—the—wind intervention and interest rate policy. The negative cor-
relations between reserve and money innovations suggest that exchange—
market intervention is over—sterilized; unanticipated increases in re-
serves go along with decreases in both Ml and M3 on a monthly basis.
Thus the U.K. data show a strong policy reaction to exchange—rate changes,
with some independent effect of M3 on the exchange rate.
IV.E. Japan
The results from the Ml system for Japan are shown in Table 7.
The results from the M3 system are essenta1ly the same. The correlations
of exchange—rate innovations with those in Ml and CAB indicate that both
of those variables drive the exchange rate, consistent with. the theory of
section II. There is also a strong positive correlation between exchange—
rate and relative price innovations.
The reserve correlations with the exchange rate and CAB strongly sug-
gest "leaning—against—the—wind't intervention, with the central bank ab-
sorbing part of the CAB innovations to reduce movement in the exchange rate.
The lack of correlation of Ml with reserves or the exchange rate indicates
sterilization. The negative correlation of Ml with industrial production
suggests that, as in Germany,monetarypolicy is aimed at stabilizing real
output.
n interesting storyemergesfrom the Japanese correlations. They
suggest that monetary policy is oriented towards domestic objectives, and
moves the exchange rate, as in section II. The authorities intervene to
neutralize this effect, and they also attempt to sterilize Ml from the
intervention.32.
IV.F. Summary of VARResultson Policy
An interesting view of how the monetary system and interdependence
have worked in the 1970s emerges from the VAR innovation correlations.
My interpretation, or inferred set of hypotheses, is as follows. The
U.S. sets monetary policy, largely by controlling quantities, with domes-
tic objectives foremost. On a monthly basis the market looks to inno-
vations in money and interest rates to set the U.S. exchange rate. The
U.S. or foreign monetary authorities attempt sterilized intervention oc-
casionally.
In Japan, monetary policy is also set according to domestic objec-
tives. As in the U.S., this moves the exchange rate, but a stronger at-
tempt is made to neutralize this effect through sterilized intervention
in Japan than in the U.S.
Movements in the U.S. and Japanese effective rates, caused partly
by fundamentals and partly by policy, are mirrored instantaneously in
the U.K. and German effective rates, and their policy reacts. The reac-
tion appears as "defensive" interest—rate movements sensitive to ex-
change—rate innovations, and largely sterilized intervention in the for-
eign exchange market. Thus a story in which domestically—oriented policy
in the U.S. and Japan is transmitted to the U.K. and Germany is consis-
tent with the VAR innovation results. This is a familiar story in
Europe.Table 7Correlations of Innovations from Japan Monthly


































































1 .00 — .09
(.43)
1 .00
NoteCAB are monthly data from Bank of Japan,
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